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Disclaimer: 
The term ‘ISIS’ children’ is used throughout this research. Bear in mind that I acknowledge 
that the term ‘children of ISIS fighters’ is better to use, in order to not to stigmatize the 
children. But due to word limitations ‘ISIS’ children’ is also used. 
 
List of abbreviations and use of terms: 
AIVD: The General Intelligence and Security Service 
Anti-ISIS coalition:  is a coalition of 82 countries, led by America to defeat ISIS in Iraq and 
Syria 
Children: International agreements in the CRC regard children as all human beings in the 
category from 0 till 18 years old 
CRC: The International Convention of the rights of the child  
ECFR: European Council of Foreign Affairs 
EU: European Union 
ISIS: also known as IS or ISIL; the Islamic State 
MENA: Middle East and North Africa 
NCTV:  National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism in the Netherlands 
NGO: Non-governmental organisation that works non-profit, independent of the government 
OCHA: Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
PM: Prime Minister 
UN: The United Nations 
UNICEF: United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
VVD: literally translated as the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, referred to as the 
Liberal party currently in rule in the Netherlands 
WHO: World Health Organisation 
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Chapter 1: Introductory Section 
1.1 Problem Statement  
The words for every child (‘voor ieder kind’) are a prominent eye-catcher on the doormat at 
the entrance of UNICEF’s office in the Netherlands, the Hague. It is a motto that all 
employees try to live by: improving the lives of children by standing up for their rights. For 
just one purpose: children are the world’s future. It was at UNICEF that my commitment to 
the fate of children in camps in Northern-Syria arose. During the period of almost a year as an 
intern and my first professional work experience as Junior children’s rights specialist, I 
learned first-hand how NGO’s lobbied behind closed doors for the sake of all children, 
without any exceptions. 
I have to confess that my personal commitment to the ethical cause of UNICEF initially 
caused quite an obstacle to let go of my personal activist opinion on this subject. At UNICEF 
I noticed that most of my colleagues at the Advocacy & Programs department shared a pro-
active repatriation stance regarding the children. Almost all colleagues shared the vision that 
children are innocent and that they should not be suffering from the consequences of their 
parents’ actions. And I agreed with that vision, but at the same time I felt that there were 
implicit complications laying behind the firm Dutch policy, than what first meets the eye. 
During my research on this matter I noticed my personal opinion shifted from being 
incredibly critical on the Dutch government towards a more nuanced opinion, as a 
consequence of the expert viewpoints I revealed in my research. I still share the opinion that 
the Dutch government makes it hard to believe that they do care about the children of 
suspected ISIS fighters. However, there are also deeper reasons that clarify the current Dutch 
foreign policy, contrary to what media sometimes depict. During the writing process of this 
thesis, my personal view continued to be in a constant state of struggle. After all, children of 
suspected ISIS fighters are innocent and could be potential future threats to our Western 
society indeed. The positive effect is that this constant personal doubt coincides with, and 
feeds, the required scientific critical curiosity in this research.  
During the writing process of this thesis I felt perfectly at ease to prioritize my objective 
scientific stance above my already existing subjective personal stance. It has been my first and 
only objective to meet the scientific standards in this Master thesis. I can perfectly live with 
the enriched insight that these are two different domains.   
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International law and especially children’s rights are clear on this issue: repatriation has to be 
active. The crucial discussion centers around politics and morality. The moral debate 
questions if the Dutch government wants to rescue these children or not. Unfortunately, such 
a question will not be easy to answer, because it is hard to prove with facts. Therefore I 
decided to focus on the political debate and apply foreign policy analysis to try to understand 
the current policy. This leads to the research question of this thesis: Why does Dutch foreign 
policy on Dutch children of suspected ISIS fighters not entail active repatriation? 
This thesis will start with an introductory section explaining the problem that justifies my 
research question. It is followed by the historical background on the children, the literature 
review tells the counter voices on the current Dutch policy and the section ends with a 
methods & methodology paragraph explaining how I will solve my research question.  
 The second part is the core of the thesis and entails the empirical section. This part 
analyses the Dutch foreign policy concerning children of suspected ISIS fighters, explains 
how the policy is justified by the Dutch government, how the Dutch public looks at the issue 
and what other countries have done.        
 The third and final part of the thesis entails the conclusion and discussion. 
It is a fact that about 3,580 foreign children from more than 30 nationalities reside in camps in 
Northern-Syria.1 Only 90 children of that total amount are Dutch nationals or can claim Dutch 
citizenship. The remaining amount of Dutch children reside outside the camps in Syria and 
Turkey (as can be seen from the graphic image below). This adds up to a total of about 210 
Dutch children in need of immediate help.2
 
1 Counted in May 2019.  Reliefweb. “Number of foreign children in North-East Syria camps up almost 45% in 
less than a month”, 14 May 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/number-foreign-children-
north-east-syria-camps-almost-45-less-month , accessed10 May 2020. 
2 It is hard for the government to verify how many children with a Dutch link have been born in Syria/ Iraq, since 
these children were never officially registered. The actual number might even be higher. AIVD, “Uitreizigers En 
Terugkeerders”, AIVD, 4 June 2020. 
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The total in this image is not 210, of some children it is still unknown where they are located exactly.3 
More than half of Dutch children are less than 4 years old.  Thus, the majority of Dutch 
children is still very young, below school-age. About 10% is 9 years or older, meaning that 
they might have attended ISIS’ military trainings. Over 75% is born there, while less than 
25% were taken to ISIS territory by their parents.4 These 210 children have no future 
prospects and are left to faith, and while these children are Dutch, they do not receive any 
help from their national government in order to return home. Hence, it is easily assumed that 
the only reason for not actively repatriating these children, is because they are (suspected) 
family members of ISIS fighters. Their link with ISIS is the burden the children are carrying.  
 
The current policy of the Dutch government upon children of suspected ISIS fighters entails a 
‘non-active’ repatriation stance. This does not mean that the Dutch government does not 
repatriate at all, but it means that the Dutch government is repatriating children only after they 
have reached a Dutch embassy or consulate themselves. 
But, barriers are being set up that make it harder for the children to return home. The Dutch 
children’s Ombudsperson prof. dr. Margrite Kalverboer rang the alarm bells in April 2018. 
She argues that the Dutch government offers a fake solution by saying that first children first 
need to reach a nearby embassy or consulate, before they can be offered help with their 
repatriation to the Netherlands. Dutch embassies exist in Turkey or Iraq, but crossing borders 
is impossible since the children often have no valid papers or passports. It is also a dangerous 
journey to partake, children might end up being arrested, incarcerated, in the worst case they 
 
3 Rijksoverheid. “Beantwoording Kamervragen over Nederlandse IS kinderen en het terugsturen naar IS-
gebied”, 26 June 2018, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/06/26/antwoorden-
kamervragen-over-nederlandse-is-kinderen-en-het-terugsturen-naar-is-gebied , accessed 3 December 2019. 
4 AIVD, “Uitreizigers En Terugkeerders”, Ibid. 
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are killed. Kalverboer, like many academic experts, expects the Dutch government to take the 
lead in Europe by starting active repatriation of the children.  
 
Reasons for expecting the Dutch government to actively repatriate boils down to the argument 
that the Netherlands is a western democracy and a protagonist of human rights. The 
Netherlands has become the international centre for justice in peace. In the Hague, hosts 
permanent UN institutions such as: the Peace Palace and the International Criminal Court. 
Dutch activist humanitarianism led to The Netherlands becoming the well known 
international centre for justice and peace.5 But that same government now violates signed 
international treaties for human rights and children’s rights.  
This blatant injustice of our government to refuse to repatriate stranded children with Dutch 
nationality inspired me to become activist on this topic. As a Dutch citizen I expect my 
government to speak up more clearly on this topic, and to pursue a more consistent and 
uniform policy. 
 
Reason for me to assume this, is because the Netherlands has been through similar situations 
like this in the past, upon which Dutch children were actively repatriated out of post-conflict 
zones. The Netherlands has accepted various controversial groups of Dutch children back into 
their society in the past. Such as the reacceptance of young Dutch boys joining a holy battle 
for the Pope by fighting in another country. 6 And the evacuation by the Dutch government of 
Dutch children after having suffered in camps of the Japanese enemy (‘Jappenkampen’) 
during the Indonesian struggle for independence between 1945-1949 in Indonesia. Back then, 
the Dutch government evacuated a total of 21.500 Dutch citizens to the Netherlands, 
including Dutch child soldiers.7 Contemporary proof lies in the reintegration of European 
(mostly male) young adults that joined terrorist groups across the Middle East as fighters in 
wars in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Iraq, etc.8 This proves to me that any other Dutch child 
would have already been repatriated by the Dutch government. 
 
5 J.J.C. Voorhoeve, Peace, Profits and Principles : a Study of Dutch Foreign Policy. Martinus Nijhoff, 1979. 
6 The Papal Zouaves in 1860’s/1870’s. Radio Interview ‘Nooit meer slapen’. “Beatrice De Graaf over 
Nederlandse strijders in het buitenland”, VPRO, 19 June 2014. www.npostart.nl/beatrice-de-graaf-over-
nederlandse-strijders-in-het-buitenland/19-06-2014/WO_VPRO_565959 , accessed 2 May 2020. 
7 Some Dutch boys (aged between 7 to 15 years) were recruited to join the battle against the Indonesian enemy 
as ‘extremely young child soldiers’ of the KNIL division (‘KNIL strijders’) of the Royal Dutch-East Indies 
Army. Rémy Limpach. De Brandende Kampongs Van Generaal Spoor. Boom, 2016, p.75.  
8 Jeanine De Roy Van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker. “Returning Western Foreign Fighters: The Case of 
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia.” Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies, 2014. 
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Also, when comparing policies with other countries, it is clear that some countries have 
actively repatriated ISIS’ children, such as Russia, Kosovo, Indonesia. The Dutch government 
might be able to learn lessons from their policies. There is proof that the Dutch government 
can overcome this issue.  
 
My argument is that because a centre-right wing political party (VVD) is ruling the 
government, a pro-active stance towards the repatriation of the children of ISIS will not be 
happening under their rule. The political climate is not suitable for an active repatriation to be 
accepted as a policy. Dutch politics shifted towards a more right-wing stance in the past three 
decades.  
 
The Dutch public is informed about the severe inhumane circumstances in the camps, various 
media outlets have informed Dutch public on this issue. Even the children’s Ombudsperson 
has criticised the Dutch policy for being inhumane and a lack of respect for international 
children’s rights. Nevertheless, the Dutch government has not changed its policy of non-
active repatriation of the children. 
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1.2  Historical background  
This paragraph offers background information on the situation of the children and their living 
conditions. It will further elaborate on the problem statement by emphasizing the severity of 
the problem of non-active repatriation of Dutch children in camps in Northern-Syria.  
After the fall of ISIS in March 2019, suspected family members of ISIS fighters -often 
consisting of only mothers with children- fled to seek shelter in (what some call refugee 
camps, others refer to as detention) camps in Northern Syria, or they were arrested and 
deported to the camps as prisoners. Most fathers of the children, the ‘terrorist fighters’, were 
killed during battles or incarcerated. 
A total of three camps in northern Syria are known to be holding children of foreign ISIS’ 
fighters. These are Al Hol, Al Roj and Ain Issa camp. Al Roj is the smallest camp providing 
shelter to some 1,700 foreign women and children9; Al Hol is the biggest camp with a 
population of 68,744 people 10 and Ain Issa is mediocre in size (12,901 inhabitants) but 
regarded as the most dangerous one. People residing in Ain Issa camp refer to it as a ‘horrific 
concentration camp’. Clothes are not provided and people have to sleep in broken tents.11  The 
situation in all three camps is described as appalling and inhumane by UN officials.12  
The camps are an unsafe and unhealthy environment for a child to grow up in. There is no 
proper access to healthcare. Mothers are suffering from dehydration, exhaustion, some are 
even reported to have died, leaving children behind as orphans. Children’s lives have been 
lost too: “Between December 2018 and September 2019, nearly 340 children died in al-Hol - 
most from preventable diseases such as severe diarrhoea or malnutrition, according to the 
International Rescue Committee.” 13 People suspected of being ISIS’ family members are not 
allowed to leave the campground and most children lack birth registration documents that are 
 
9 Last counted in May 2019. Reach, “Camp Profile - Roj, Al-Hasakeh governorate, Syria, April - May 2019”, 
Reliefweb, 12 Jul. 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/camp-profile-roj-al-hasakeh-
governorate-syria-april-may-2019 , accessed 2 May 2020. 
10 Last counted in November 2019. Reliefweb. “OCHA Situation Report North East Syria: Al Hol Camp”, 
OCHA, 21 Nov. 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/al_hol_snapshot_21nov2019.pdf , 
accessed 3 May 2020. 
11  Reach, “Camp Profile”, Ibid. 
12 UN News, “UN report on Syria conflict highlights inhumane detention of women and children”, UN News, 11 
Sep. 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1046102 , accessed 2 May 2020. 
13 Letta Tayler. “Fear grips women and children trapped in Syria camps”, Human Rights Watch, 18 Oct. 2019, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/18/fear-grips-women-and-children-trapped-syria-camps , accessed 5 May 
2020. 
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required to be allowed to travel. These children are literally stranded in the camps with no 
way out, unless their national government decides to help them to return home.14   
Especially Al Hol camp is known for being a humanitarian crisis. Another example: families 
and unaccompanied children that fled to the camp arrived there with war wounds; they had 
bullets or parts of grenades in their bodies or were even missing body parts, but were left 
untreated upon arrival.15           
Basics of primary needs are lacking and the camps consist of very limited resources. UNICEF 
has the lead in taking care of these vulnerable children. Shortages in basic needs such as 
electricity, space, healthy food, clean water, latrines and sanitation facilities are the main 
concern. The lack of hygiene is an issue that causes problems, therefore diseases in the camps 
spread quickly.16 Together with WHO, UNICEF tries to help undernourished children. They 
vaccinate against polio, tuberculosis, offer additional medical care to (pregnant) mothers and 
children, and provide warm clothing and lamps in order to survive. The winters in Northeast 
Syria get incredibly cold (snow) while the summers are extremely hot and dry. It is a hard 
time working for humanitarian organisations since their work is continuously suspended by 
local authorities.17 Also, there is no certainty if children are offered any form of education in 
the camps and there is no view on what the health condition (physically and mentally) of the 
children looks like.18  
The Kurds do not have the resources to take care of all children in the camps for a long period 
of time. They have continuously asked the international community to step in and help them 
with resources and to repatriate their national citizens out of the camps. This is an obstacle for 
the Dutch government because of the diplomatic international tensions that lie in cooperating 
 
14 Save the Children, “Syria: Children dying in freezing conditions in camps as more than a quarter of Idlib 
displaced”, Reliefweb, 18 Feb. 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-children-dying-
freezing-conditions-camps-more-quarter-idlib , accessed 10 May 2020. 
15 Al Jazeera, “Red Cross: Hundreds of unaccompanied children flood Syria camp”, Al Jazeera News, 3 Apr. 
2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/red-cross-hundreds-unaccompanied-children-flood-syria-camp-
190403094923776.html , accessed 4 May 2020. 
16 Reliefweb. “OCHA Situation Report North East Syria: Al Hol Camp”, OCHA, accessed on 21 Nov. 2019, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/al_hol_snapshot_21nov2019.pdf , accessed 1 May 2020. 
17 AIVD, “Uitreizigers En Terugkeerders”, Ibid. 
18 Magrite Kalverboer. “Position Paper: Nederland Moet Kinderen in Kampen Beschermen.” De 
Kinderombudsman, 19 Apr. 2018, www.dekinderombudsman.nl/nieuws/nederland-moet-kinderen-in-kampen-
beschermen , accessed10 April 2020. 
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with the Kurdish officials, they are not considered an official entity by the UN. The situation 
in post-civil war torn Syria is complicated. 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 Rudi Vranckx, “Voor de zonden van de vaders”, VRT NWS, 16 Nov. 2018, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7sY6Gz3VUbU#action=share , accessed 12 May 2020. 
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1.3 Literature review: the counter voices    
Because the current policy of the Dutch government already entails a passive repatriation 
position, most available literature on this topic countermands the Dutch policy by advocating 
for an active repatriation. The academics and professionals mentioned in this paragraph are 
worried about the situation in the camps for the children and hope that governments start 
seeing the severity of the situation and start repatriating actively, or as an alternative to 
arrange reception in the region. 
These experts have spoken out about their discontent with the current Dutch policy through 
media outlets by participating in television debates or bringing their opinion forward in their 
columns in newspapers. No deep studies on this topic have been done by academics or experts 
yet, therefore I rely heavily on media outlets in this paragraph. One has to bear in mind that 
all of the following people mentioned have their own agenda to advocate for or against active 
repatriation.  
Professor in International Children’s Rights Ton Liefaard elaborates further on the claims of 
the Children’s Ombudsperson and investigated if the Dutch policy is in conflict with 
international legal agreements. The Dutch government justifies their non-active repatriation 
by claiming that the international convention of the rights of the child (CRC) does not force 
states to bring the children back. 20  
International Criminal Defence lawyer Geert-Jan Knoops refers to the Dutch policy as a tactic 
of ‘burying your head in the sand’ (‘struisvogelpolitiek’). The Dutch government is avoiding 
to accept the politically unwanted consequences that lie in active repatriation. But still, the 
responsibility to act remains and each state should protect their national citizens, Knoops 
says.21 But political courage is required.22 
There are two important reasons that do oblige the Dutch government to start active 
repatriation, according to Liefaard: Nationality is what binds these children to the 
Netherlands. The children either already have a Dutch nationality if they were born in the 
Netherlands, and when they are born in Syria / Iraq they have the possibility to claim Dutch 
 
20 C.M. Sandelowsky and T. Liefaard. “De Verantwoordelijkheden Van Nederland Voor Kinderen Met Een 
Nederlandse Link in Voormalige IS-Strijdgebieden Bezien Vanuit Het Internationale Kinderrechtenperspectief.” 
44, 2019. 
21 NPO, “De Nieuwe maan. Seizoen 6, afl 5. Moeten we jihadstrijders en hun gezinnen terughalen?”, NTR, 1 
Mar. 2019, https://www.npostart.nl/de-nieuwe-maan/01-03-2019/VPWON_1301675 , accessed10 May 2020. 
22 Marion van San. Kalifaatontvluchters. Prometheus, 2019. 
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citizenship (with proof through DNA-tests) because one or two of their parents are Dutch. The 
Dutch government is responsible for Dutch citizens.     
 Second of all, because the rights of the children are at stake. Based on reports of the 
UN and Human Rights Watch, various international children’s rights are being violated by 
(non actor) states in Turkey, Iraq and Syria. Especially the right to; life, development and 
survival (article 6 CRC) are currently at risk. 23 
Liefaard also says that the CRC law that children are not allowed to be separated from their 
parents, has exceptions. If it is in the best interest of the child to do so, the government can 
decide to precede the right of the best interest of the child over the right for the child not to 
separated from their parents.24          
One of the greatest concerns of the Dutch government is the right to family reunification, that 
could apply whenever the children are taken back to the Netherlands.25 ISIS’ families are seen 
as a threat to Western society so no Western government is awaiting their return with open 
arms. The Children’s Ombudsperson counterarguments this statement by saying that when the 
children are brought to the Netherlands (with or without parents) they are protected from their 
parents here, something that is not possible if they remain in the camps.26    
The potential security threat that children of ISIS might pose, according to the Dutch 
government and reports of the AIVD & NCTV, is another issue. Liefaard believes that threat 
is very small, especially considering the youngest children.27  
Their traumas could be a solid reason for governments to start active repatriation soon, 
according to Psychology and (Counter-)Terrorism professor Anne Speckhard. During her 
interviews with ISIS’ child defectors, she noticed these boys suffered “more than a lifetime’s 
quantity of traumatic bereavement and horror”. Immediate help is needed to help the children 
get back on their feet.28 
Child psychologist Gerrit Loots is specialised in the treatment of traumatised children. During 
his two visits to the camps in Northern-Syria, in October 2018 and in June 2019, Loots has 
 
23 C.M. Sandelowsky and T. Liefaard. Ibid. 
24 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. “Convention on the Rights of the Child.” 
OHCHR, 2 Sep. 1990, www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx , accessed 5 January 2020. 
25 C.M. Sandelowsky and T. Liefaard, Ibid. 
26 Margrite Kalverboer. Ibid. 
27 AIVD & NCTV, “Minderjarigen bij ISIS”, AIVD, 6 Apr. 2017, p.6. 
28 Anne Speckhard. ISIS Defectors: inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate. Advances Press, LLC, 2016. 
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done psychological tests with a group of Belgian ISIS children.29 The aim was to observe if 
the children are traumatised and indoctrinated by their time living under ISIS regime and in a 
war zone.30 In comparison to their last visit in 2018, the situation had worsened and the 
children had a hard time concentrating, they were fighting more often over toys and started 
throwing it around; signs of psychological stress, but no extreme aggressiveness.31 Only few 
children observed seemed to be ‘heavily traumatized’, but according to Loots’ previous 
research on children in war, these children can function perfectly normal again in a safe 
environment. Therefore the children need therapy, “there is no time to loose”.32 None of the 
examined children were found to be indoctrinated by IS ideology. Especially the younger 
children (younger than 6 years old) can not have been radicalised to such an extent that it is 
irreversible. Loots thus observed that the children in the camps are no danger to Western 
society 33 
Counter-terrorism expert and professor International Relations Beatrice de Graaf agrees with 
Loots’ theory, according to her the children will adapt easily once they return to the 
Netherlands. Children are resilient and flexible.34 But, “The longer these children stay in the 
camps, the sooner they will become ‘ticking timebombs’. The camps are a breeding ground for 
radicalisation.35 De Graaf adds to that notion that leaving the children in the camps will do 
them more harm. “When bringing them here, we can keep an eye on them”36. Leaving them in 
Syria will make their movements unpredictable and untraceable, they might return illegally 
and stay under the radar to plan a terrorist attack.37      
 
29 After contacting dr. Gerrit Loots via e-mail, he pointed me at the website of his research team. Youth at Social 
Risk. “Research Projects in Syria”. Voice, https://youthatsocialrisk.be/projects/syria/ , accessed 7 April 2020. 
30 Hassan Bahara. “Komen De IS-Kinderen Ooit Nog Terug?” De Volkskrant, 6 Nov. 2018, 
www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/komen-de-is-kinderen-ooit-nog-terug~b927dd12/ , accessed 5 Feb. 
2020. 
31 Anneke Stoffelen and Hassan Bahara. “'Haal Je Vrouwelijke Syriëgangers En Hun Kinderen Niet Terug, Dan 
Is Het Wachten Op Aanslagen'.” De Volkskrant, 6 Aug. 2019, www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/haal-je-
vrouwelijke-syriegangers-en-hun-kinderen-niet-terug-dan-is-het-wachten-op-aanslagen~bab200de/ , accessed 7 
January 2020. 
32 Rudi Vranckx, Ibid. 
33 Gerrit Loots has done previous research on the reintegration of child soldiers in North-Uganda and Colombia. 
Loots, G., Viaene, C., Jamai, H., Quaghebeur, S., & Ryckx, S. (2018). RAPPORT BEZOEK AAN BELGISCHE 
KINDEREN IN KOERDISCHE VLUCHTELINGENKAMPEN IN NOORD-OOST SYRIË 13 – 21 oktober 2018. 
34 Beatrice de Graaf, “Reïntegratie IS-Strijders Na Celstraf Is Niet Kansloos.” NRC, 28 Oct. 2019, 
www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/10/28/reintegratie-is-strijders-na-cel-is-niet-kansloos-a3978273 , accessed 12 
December 2019. 
35 Anneke Stoffelen and Hassan Bahara. Ibid. 
36 Beatrice de Graaf, Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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Belgian Jihadi- and Islam expert Montasser Alde’emeh is one of the few academics that 
openly speaks against any form of repatriation of children of ISIS’ fighters.38 “These 
members of ISIS do not deserve to be repatriated. They do not even deserve a debate.”39 
Alde’emeh believes that because of the horrible crimes ISIS committed, the ISIS families 
have lost their right to be repatriated. He says its best to leave them in Syria.40 “It is plausible 
that children with jihadist parents will ask about their father and who killed him. What will 
their mother respond? And what if they hear that it were Belgian of Dutch bombs that killed 
their father in Syria, would that child not want to take revenge when becoming older?”41
 Alde’emeh points out that the breeding ground for radicalisation also exists in Europe, 
which is a risk for returning children of ISIS.  For example: returnees are believers of Islam, 
but upon return they would have to live in a democratic, mostly non-religious, polarized, 
Western society where their beliefs are not always felt to be understood. Besides, their socio-
economic status remains living in poverty and having low job prospects. Such factors do not 
provide a proper ground for a ‘fresh’ start in the Netherlands. 42   
The least the Dutch government can do, as Liefaard proposes, is to use diplomatic measures to 
prevent the violation of children’s rights in the camps. 43Alde’emeh proposes that: “Europe 
can help by investing money into their housing and education there”. Being raised in a 
Muslim society will make the children able to show their identity without causing any stir.44  
The Dutch government is claiming it has to choose between one of these two: bringing the 
children into safety and prioritizing the best interest of the child, or prioritizing the safety of 
Dutch society and leaving the children in Syria. 45 According to Gerrit Loots the real struggle 
rather exists between going for revenge or pursuing justice for the children.46 
Liefaard concludes his plea by stating that it is unclear if the best interest of the child has been 
taken in consideration during the formation of the Dutch policy. 47 That is where the gap lies 
 
38 Cyril Rosman. “Jihadexpert Alde’emeh: Jihadisten terughalen naar Europa is naïef” Algemeen Dagblad, 14 
July 2019, https://www.ad.nl/wetenschap/jihadexpert-alde-emeh-jihadisten-terughalen-naar-europa-is-
naief~ad17c210/?referrer=https://www.google.com/ , accessed 3 May 2020. 
39 NPO, “De Nieuwe maan.” Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Cyril Rosman. Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 C.M. Sandelowsky and T. Liefaard. Ibid. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Rudi Vranckx. Ibid. 
47 C.M. Sandelowsky and T. Liefaard. Ibid. 
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in the existing literature on this topic. In the empirical section I will research if the Dutch 
government is prioritizing the best interest of these children and how. 
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1.4 Methods, Methodology and Sources   
In this paragraph, the methods, methodology and the sources used to study the research 
question are discussed. My research question is as follows: Why does Dutch foreign policy on 
Dutch children of suspected ISIS fighters not entail an active repatriation? The answer unfolds 
in three sections. 
The first section highlights the context of the problem, the execution of the research and 
essential background information on the topic. The core section of the thesis entails the 
empirical section. It offers an analysis of the current Dutch policy by means of process-
tracing, looking at the public debate and a comparative analysis of policies of (European) 
countries. The third and final section presents the discussion and conclusion. 
The primary method of approach is foreign policy analysis (FPA). By analysing the process 
and outcomes of Dutch foreign policy we can understand the diplomatic and political reasons 
behind the current foreign policy of non-active repatriation of Dutch children of ISIS. FPA is 
the most appropriate method to answer the research question because it allowed me to 
approach the issue from a national perspective while simultaneously zooming out and looking 
at the broader international picture. This approach generates the following set of sub-
questions: 
- What is the current Dutch policy on children of ISIS? 
- How has the current Dutch policy been established?  
- What arguments does the government use to justify their policy? 
- What do proponents and opponents say about the issue? 
- What does the public debate entail? 
- What do the policies of other (European) countries entail? 
- For what reasons do other countries pursue active repatriation over passive repatriation? 
- How is the current policy holding stance and do not lead to adjustments? 
 
Hence, the methodological approach of this thesis is to gain more in-depth understanding of 
the contemporary policy of non-active repatriation. In order to answer these questions I have 
conducted qualitative literature research and focus on content analysis.  
 Besides academic literature I also rely on media articles. The reason for that is that this 
topic is so very much up-to-date that policies kept evolving during the writing process of the 
thesis. Not as many academic research as hoped could be found on the research topic yet, 
therefore more media articles were added to supplement shortcoming resources. The sources 
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were collected through the University Library and search engines on the internet such as 
Google (Scholar), the University catalogue, databases such as J-Stor, SAGE journals online 
and through the use of reports by UN bodies such as OCHA, UNICEF and the UN Security 
Council. Thanks to hints of former colleagues of the UNICEF office in the Netherlands I 
consulted the academic works of Thomas Renard and Ton Liefaard on this issue. I also 
contacted professor dr. Gerrit Loots, Child psychology Professor, by e-mail in an attempt to 
trace his reports of his visits to the camps in Northern Syria. He sent me the link to the 
website of his organisation that provided valuable additional information. 
This topic touches upon various fields in society and should not be looked at from one 
perspective only. I thus involved a great variety of academics, scholars and professional from 
different backgrounds. Therefore I included the views of experts on children’s rights, human 
rights, international laws and agreements in international relations, politics, (counter-) 
terrorism, child psychology and jihadism. Also, a mixture of Dutch and international (mostly 
in English, some in Flemish, French or German) sources were used to develop an unbiased 
and complete overview on the matter. 
The primary sources used are government researches by the institutions AIVD and NCTV 
and transcripts of debates in the House of Representatives (‘Tweede Kamer’), informative 
letters by the Ministry of Security and Justice on this topic, all of which are publicly 
accessible. Most of this original material was used for the empirical section.   
Through process-tracing I managed to trace the origins of the current policy, and the 
justifications the government uses to legitimize their policy. The aim of process-tracing was 
to unravel the current aversive sentiment towards an active repatriation, which prevails in the 
Dutch government (and are mostly kept behind closed doors). By looking at the evolving 
policy and analysing that process step by step, I exposed the unwillingness of the Dutch 
government to change their policy. 
Secondary sources in this thesis are books and articles composed  by (contemporary) 
historians that focus on Dutch foreign policy and Dutch international relations. In addition,  
expert opinions are conducted through the use of mainly high quality media outlets like NRC 
Handelsblad, De Volkskrant and the Dutch public broadcast NOS (Nederlandse Omroep 
Stichting). These sources also offer (online) news articles on events concerning the situation 
of the children and expose the public opinion on this matter. 
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Secondary sources were needed for the comparative analysis of Dutch policy with other 
(European) countries, to find out what lessons the Dutch government could learn from other 
governments facing this same politically sensitive issue.  
As explained above, most literature quoted in this research is quite recent due to the fact that 
this topic focuses on current affairs. Therefore no study using the FPA method to approach 
the issue of the children has been conducted yet.  
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Chapter 2:  Empirical Section: Dutch Foreign Policy Analysis 
2.1  What is the policy and how is it justified? 
In this paragraph the method of process-tracing is applied understand how the policy of non-
active repatriation of Dutch ISIS’ children has emerged. Because the Dutch government has 
not openly talked about it in the media or brought statements forward, I aim to find out 
through process-tracing, what the sentiment is in the House of Representatives. It is a step by 
step analysis of all government discussions concerning this issue, during the period of March 
2018 till November 2019. I have decided to limit my scope to this period because the 
discussion is still ongoing. This period marks the beginning of discussions within Dutch 
politics about the repatriation of Dutch ISIS’ children until the day that case was taken to  
Court.  
This timeline is conducted by searching the website of the House of Representatives for all 
official documents in which ISIS children are discussed. I filtered by looking at issues 
handled by the Ministry of Security and Justice and Foreign Affairs and searched for terms 
like ‘children of ISIS’, ‘orphaned children’ in Dutch. 
Timeline:     
2018 
The first time the House of Representatives began asking questions concerning Dutch 
children of ISIS’ fighters was during the general consultation in the House of Representatives 
on 28th of March 2018. One of the reasons for politicians to start asking questions about the 
children, was the documentary by Dutch journalist Sinan Can ‘The lost children of the 
Caliphate’, that was broadcast on tv only two days before. 48 The Minister for Migration 
(Mark Harbers) was asked to give more openness about the children: what are their 
nationalities, how many have a Dutch passport and how many are orphans. 49 In other words, 
politicians asked: What can the government do for these children?50    
 The Minister for Migration replied that this was not the time nor the moment to ask 
 
48 Sinan, Can. ‘De verloren kinderen van het kalifaat’, NPO, 26 Mar. 2018. 
49 Overheid. “AO Opvang, Terugkeer en Bewaring op 28 maart 2018”, 11 Apr. 2018, 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32317-512.html , accessed 10 December 2019. 
50 Overheid. “Kamerstuk 19 637 nr. 2383”, 26 Apr. 2018. 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-19637-2383.html , accessed 14 May 2020. 
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such questions since “These people are not asylum seekers nor refugees”, and admitted that 
he was not able to answer properly.  
Therefore, the case of ISIS’ children was handed over from the Minister of Migration to the 
Minister of Security and Justice. 
On 10 April 2018, the Ministry of Justice and Security stated that as a member of the 
European Union, the Dutch government aims for the creation of a common European 
approach in repatriating ISIS children. The Dutch government claims that the children need to 
be treated as victims. And in case of their return to the Netherlands, they must be taken care 
of by the Dutch government. Therefore, a team of the Child Protection Council has been set 
up to help the children’s care takers and foster families.51 The Minister of Justice and Security 
(Ferdinand Grapperhaus) also admitted that they do not know exactly where the mothers with 
children are at the moment, how many we are speaking of and if they are still alive. Some are 
still with ISIS, some are in (refugee)camps. And “It can not be said with certainty that there 
are any orphans with a Dutch link currently in Syria and Iraq, due to the circumstances 
there”, the embassy of the Netherlands in Syria is closed, so diplomatic ties with the Syrian 
authorities do not exist. 
The Children’s Ombudsperson, Margrite Kalverboer did not accept this answer, so on the 
16th of April 2018 she brought forward her position paper on the topic, as mentioned before. 
On the 26 of June 2018, Grapperhaus finally responded to the questions asked in April. In 
this letter, for the first time, he elaborates on the three main reasons that contribute to the 
policy of the Dutch government towards the children: unsafe situation in Northern-Syria, 
complicated international relations that are at stake (with the Kurds) and the safety of the 
repatriated can not be fully guaranteed. The Minister52 says that children are victims of 
decisions their parents made, but the indoctrination and military training at ISIS of some 
children poses national security risks. The Minister agrees with the Children’s Ombudsperson 
that the best interest of the child has to be taken into account when it comes to repatriating, 
but when looking at the International Convention of the Rights of the Child, the government 
is not bound to act for these children in any way. The Netherlands wants to realize 
international cooperation on this issue but will not start actively repatriating the minors in 
 
51 Rijksoverheid. “Kamerbrief over Nederlandse inzet in EU-besprekingen over ISIS vrouwen en kinderen”, 10 
Apr. 2018,  https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/04/10/tk-nederlandse-inzet-in-eu-
besprekingen-over-isis-vrouwen-en-kinderen , accessed 10 May 2020. 
52 From now an with Minister is referred to the Minister of Security and Justice, Ferdinand Grapperhaus. 
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Syria themselves. ISIS’ families have to report themselves to the nearest Dutch consulate. The 
Dutch government is not offering help to its citizens in Syria and Iraq, not to children either. 
Grapperhaus does say that he will keep an eye on the situation, and keep talking with the 
parties (authorities and NGO’s) involved. For the first time the argument is used that the 
safety of the people to be repatriated, can not be guaranteed once a European arrest warrant 
has been issued. Concluding, the Minister said that taking children back would mean taking 
the parents back as well, because separating children from their parents is just not legally 
permissible. 53 
Starting from this moment the children have always been mentioned in connection to posing a 
terrorist threat to Dutch society. 
In October 2018 Grapperhaus responded to questions asked by the House of Representatives 
on 26 June 2018. In his response he repeated that the Dutch government will not actively 
repatriate ISIS fighters, families and minors due to the major threat they might pose to Dutch 
society. He clarified that the criminal investigation executed by the Dutch government does 
not apply to minors. But that, according to an ‘Open terrorism research’ the children might 
pose a threat. 54 
6 December 2018: The Minister mostly repeats what he already said before about the 
important factors to not actively repatriate. It is an unsafe area to travel to, look at the travel 
advice, it says do not travel to Syria. The safety analysis done by NCTV is what the Minister 
keeps referring to as the reason behind the Dutch governments position towards not taking the 
children back.55 
2019 
In the beginning of 2019 it seemed like the Ministry of Justice and Security was starting to 
change its point of view towards the children of ISIS’ foreign fighters, specifically concerning 
orphaned children. 
 
53 Brief regering. “Reactie op het verzoek van het lid Buitenweg19 april 2018”,Tweede Kamer, 26 June 2018, 
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2018Z12461&did=2018D36174 , 
accessed 18 May 2020. 
54 Rijksoverheid. “Openbare samenvatting Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 47”, 26 Mar. 2018. 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2018/03/26/openbare-samenvatting-dreigingsbeeld-
terrorisme-nederland-47, accessed 7 April 2020. 
55 Overheid. “Kamerstuk 29754 nr. 483”, 10 Dec. 2018. 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-29754-483.html , accessed 10 April 2020. 
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When in February the Dutch media reported the death of an ISIS mother who left behind two 
orphaned children, Grapperhaus reported to the media that he had been talking with the 
Kurdish authorities to find a way to bring the children into safety.56 This was a reason for the 
House of Representatives to ask for clarification, since Grapperhaus never informed them of a 
renewed policy, but the policy did already seem changed as to what he reported in the media. 
In his letter of the 21st of February 2019, Grapperhaus informed the House of 
Representatives that the responsibilities laid down in the CRC towards orphaned ISIS’ 
children are more profound. Therefore, Dutch officials are in touch with Kurdish officials in 
Northern Syria to investigate how these children could be repatriated. But still, the situation 
remains complex and very little actions can be taken in the dangerous region.57 
Noticeable is that from February 2019 on, various members of the Parliament began to ask 
questions about the situation of Dutch ISIS children on a regular basis, no just sporadically. 
So, political pressure from inside the Parliament started to be noticeable. Grapperhaus’ 
statement in the media could be regarded as a slight opening towards a more proactive stance.  
On 16 April 2019, Grapperhaus responded to questions asked by members of the Parliament 
on 21 March 2019. He was asked to clarify the situation of Dutch orphans in Syria. 
Grapperhaus informs about the repatriation of a few young French orphaned ISIS children (on 
15 March 2019) and children whose parents are imprisoned in Syria. The French government 
has not changed its passive repatriation stance, and used military means to accomplish this. 
Grapperhaus explained he is in close contact with French officials on the issue, as well as with 
other European states. The Netherlands is investigating how the Dutch children of ISIS could 
be repatriated, maybe with the help of the International Red Cross. 58 
It seems like the French example is mentioned as a precursor to what is going to happen by 
repatriating a few Dutch ISIS children in the future. 
16 May 2019, Grapperhaus answers to questions asked by members of the Parliament on 8 
April 2019 concerning the fact that a daughter of Dutch ISIS fighter has died in a camp in 
Syria. The Minister acknowledges that the situation in the camps is severe, repeats that the 
 
56 NOS. “Nederland onderzoekt terughalen vrouwelijke Syriëgangers en kinderen”, NOS Nieuws, 1 Feb. 2019, 
https://nos.nl/artikel/2270059-nederland-onderzoekt-terughalen-vrouwelijke-syriegangers-en-kinderen.html , 
accessed 2 January 2020. 
57 Overheid. “Kamerstuk 29754, nr. 492”, 21 Feb 2019,  https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-29754-
492.html , accessed 6 April 2020. 
58 Overheid. “Kamerstuk 29754, nr. 499”, 16 Apr. 2019, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-29754-
499.html , accessed 4 May 2020. 
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Dutch policy remains the same and stresses that parents are first and foremost responsible for 
their children. The fact that repatriation of the children would mean repatriating the parents 
too, is once again stressed to be an important factor in maintaining a restrictive policy.59 
But, on 10 June 2019 Minister of Security and Justice and the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(Stef Blok) announced that on that day the French government handed over two Dutch 
orphaned children to be placed under a legal guardian in the Netherlands. The ministers 
stressed that this was only a unique exception to the rule, since these children could not be 
taken care of in the camp.  
One could argue that after the repatriation of two Dutch orphaned children, the government’s 
assertion that it is too dangerous for Dutch officials to travel to norther Syria to repatriate was 
no longer thought to be believable. It might be risky, but clearly it is possible.60 
11 June 2019 a member of the Liberal Party asked more information to be shared about the 
repatriation to the Minister of Foreign Affairs during ‘question time’ at the Upper House. 
Blok emphasized that these children are too young (2 and 4 years old) to have been 
indoctrinated with ISIS’ ideology, therefore they do not pose a risk to Dutch society. Passive 
repatriation policy remains, no new policy will be implemented. Northern-Syria continues to 
be very unsafe, the operation was highly secured. This repatriation was an exceptional 
circumstance. 
26 June 2019: Minister of Foreign Affairs Blok and Minister of Foreign Trade and 
Development Aid (Sigrid Kaag) replied to questions asked on 5 April 2019. These Ministers 
acknowledged that it is almost impossible for a child to reach a Dutch embassy in Turkey or 
Iraq on their own. Also, the situation in the camps was explained to more detail: the situation 
is severe, camps are over capacitated and humanitarian help is minimal. The Dutch 
government donates money to NGO’s to improve reception in the region. The Red Cross has 
initiated it wants to help with repatriation in the future, but Ministers stress that is not likely to 
happen soon, because the repatriation of the parents is considered a national security risk.61 
 
59 Kamervragen. Antwoord op vragen over het bericht ‘Dochtertje van Nederlandse Syriëganger overleden in 
vluchtelingenkamp’, Tweede Kamer, 16 May 2020, 
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2019Z06995&did=2019D17905, accessed 5 
March 2020. 
60 Joop. “Weeskinderen uit IS-gebied overgedragen aan Nederland”, BNN Vara, 10 June 2019, 
https://joop.bnnvara.nl/nieuws/weeskinderen-uit-is-gebied-overgedragen-aan-nederland , accessed 12 May 2020. 
61 Overheid. “Kamervragen: VVD en CDA zien geen heil in terughalen IS-kinderen”, 26 June 2019, 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/ah-tk-20182019-3176.html , accessed5 May 2020. 
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It shows that the Dutch government contradicts its own policy. On the one hand it is 
acknowledged that children need to reach an embassy or consulate before offered help with 
repatriation. But on the other hand the government sees that children are, in many cases, not 
able to reach an embassy by themselves. Thus the Dutch government does not offer a proper 
solution. 
3 July 2019, Grapperhaus answered questions that were asked on 20 June. Most information 
he shared was nothing knew. Noticeable was that he avoided answering the question that 
insinuated that is no longer unsafe for Dutch officials to actively repatriate children out of the 
camps, ever since orphans have been repatriated and the Kurds offered the Dutch government 
an agreement to help bringing Dutch ISIS children into safety. Grapperhaus’ answer was that 
policy still remains the same.62 
It seems that the Dutch government keeps needing to defend their non-active repatriation 
policy by saying two orphans were really just an exception. They have opened a so called ‘can 
of worms’ by repatriating a few, but not all children. Also, the fact that children can not be 
taken away from their parents according to the CRC, and that parents have to repatriated 
together with the children, is what refrains the Dutch government from taking on a proactive 
stance. It is a way of circular reasoning consisting the fact that children need help, but help 
can not be offered unless the children go to an embassy themselves, which in most cases the 
children can not do. 
11 September 2019, Grapperhaus and Blok answered questions asked on 19 June concerning 
the faith of two very young Dutch children (3 months and 3 years old) stuck in a camp 
without their parents.  The answer is that individual cases can not be discussed in public. 
These children are probably not legible for active repatriation, they have to go to a nearby 
embassy alone. The question was raised how children of that young age are believed to 
undertake that travel alone, and avoided offering a proper solution by saying that the Ministry 
of Foreign affairs does not act as legal guardian of these children. 63 
24 September 2019, Grapperhaus answered questions asked on 13 August. It is true that 
America has offered to help repatriate Dutch ISIS members out of Syria. On 28 June 2019 the 
 
62 Overheid. “Kamervragen over het bericht dat Nederland met kinderlevens speelt”, 9 July 2019, 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/ah-tk-20182019-3320.html, accessed 4 June 2020. 
63 Tweedemonitor. “Antwoord op vragen van de leden Ploumen en Kuiken over de baby en peuter van een 
Nederlandse vader die zich zonder ouders in een kamp in Noord-Syrië bevinden”, 11 Sep. 2019, 
“https://www.tweedemonitor.nl/kamervraag/2019D32962 , accessed 5 June 2020. 
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USA offered to facilitate the transport of 10 Dutch women and their children, but the Dutch 
government refused the offer. It would take away the issue of Dutch officials needing to travel 
to dangerous area, but the danger still exists for the returnees. Also, a new issue is presented: 
deciding to repatriate is a danger for all European States, the Dutch government does not want 
to jeopardize this relationship. The US has offered to help all European states with 
repatriating, until now only Italy has accepted that offer upon the return of one national 
citizen. 
On 8 October 2019, Grapperhaus and Blok answered questions asked on 21 August about the 
repatriation of German ISIS’ children. The Netherlands did not know about this German 
initiative, even though the government is in close contact with all other EU-states  about the 
repatriation of ISIS’ families. Every country takes that decision individually. The Ministers 
also admitted that it is not known how the children are doing (mentally and physically), but 
that there is a plan for each child. Upon return children will be monitored and helped to 
overcome their traumas and reintegrate by a team of experts. 64 
It seems that even if the greatest obstacles are taken away, the Dutch government presents 
another (new) argument for not changing its policy into active repatriation. 
What happened from 11 November 2019 onwards: 
On 11 November 2019, 23 Dutch mothers combined strengths to demand repatriation of 
themselves and their 56 children out of the camps and back to the Netherlands.65 The decision 
of the Court (‘Rechtbank’) got great media attention since the decision turned out to be in 
favour of repatriating the children.  
The Court had ruled that the Dutch state is obliged to make an effort concerning the children, 
but that the state is not obliged to help the mothers. The judge emphasized that the case of the 
children is a great emergency, and that children are the victims of the decisions of their 
parents. The judge claimed that protecting Dutch children in Syria is the concern of the Dutch 
state, but it must not lead to taking unnecessary security risks in Syria66 The majority of the 
 
64 Kamervragen. “Antwoord op de vragen over het terughalen van Duitse kinderen uit Syrië door Duitsland”,  8 
Oct. 2020, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2019D37961&did=2019D37961 
accessed 17 May 2020. 
65 Lennart, Bloemhof. “Uitspraak over IS-Kinderen Zorgt Voor Vraagtekens En 'Lichtpunten'.” NOS, 11 Nov. 
2019, nos.nl/artikel/2310037-uitspraak-over-is-kinderen-zorgt-voor-vraagtekens-en-lichtpunten.html , accessed 7 
January 2020. 
66 De Rechtspraak. “Uitspraken ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2019:11909”, 11 Nov. 2019, 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2019:11909 , accessed 5 April 2020. 
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Cabinet was not satisfied with the outcome of this case and appealed the case to the Court of 
Justice.67  
When the case was appealed, the Court of Justice (‘Gerechtshof’) in The Hague decided on 22 
November 2019 that a judge can not force the Dutch state to repatriate children and their 
mothers out of Syria. The former decision on November 11th 2019 of the Court therefore 
destroyed.68 Conclusion of this outcome is that the Dutch government is not allowed to be 
legally compelled to make an effort to repatriate the children nor the mothers, since it is a 
decision too political for law to intertwine with.69 
Many politicians (especially VVD) were relieved and said to be happy with the outcome of 
the appeal, especially the Minister of Security and Justice, who has the lead in this case. He 
said it was the decision of the mothers to join a terrorist organisation, so there will be no 
active repatriation for no family members.70  
PM Mark Rutte also expressed his satisfaction with the outcome in the weekly press 
conference on 22 November 2019. Rutte mentioned that the outcome of the Court on 11 
November had already surprised the Cabinet, because a judge can not force the Dutch 
government to seek cooperation with the United States to facilitate active repatriation. He 
said: “It is crazy for a Court to intervene in a state’s foreign policy.” Rutte added that 
international diplomacy is not a suitable topic to be openly discussed, suggesting that it should 
be discussed behind closed doors on top political level only. He also pointed out that other 
European countries are not repatriating either, so the Netherlands will not risk putting that 
relationship at stake.    
By replying to the question if Rutte wants ISIS’ supporters to return to the Netherlands he 
replied: “I would rather not see them return. But if they turn up reporting themselves at one of 
the Dutch embassies in the region (Turkey or Erbil in Iraq) than we will help them return. 
 
67 NOS. “Kamer ook na uitspraak rechter verdeeld over terughalen IS-kinderen”, NOS Nieuws, 11 Nov. 2019, 
https://nos.nl/artikel/2310000-kamer-ook-na-uitspraak-rechter-verdeeld-over-terughalen-is-kinderen.html , 
accessed 5 June 2020. 
68 De Rechtspraak. “Zaak over het terughalen van Nederlandse kinderen en hun moeders uit opvangkampen in 
Noord-Syrië versneld behandeld”, 10 Jan. 2020, https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-en-
contact/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad-der-Nederlanden/Nieuws/Paginas/Zaak-over-het-terughalen-van-Nederlandse-
kinderen-en-hun-moeders-uit-opvangkampen-in-Noord-Syrie-versneld-behandeld.aspx , accessed 17 May 2020. 
69 De Rechtspraak. “Uitspraken ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2019:3208”, 22 Nov 2019, 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2019:3208 , accessed 5 April 2020. 
70 BNN. “Staat hoeft Nederlandse IS-kinderen toch níet terug te halen”, BNN VARA, 22 Nov. 2019, 
https://www.bnnvara.nl/zembla/artikelen/staat-hoeft-nederlandse-is-kinderen-toch-net-terug-te-halen , accessed 
17 May 2020. 
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This also happened this week with two mothers with children. So I can not guarantee they will 
not be coming back on their own.”.71 
The mothers of the children of ISIS fighters have taken their case another step further by 
appealing in cassation at the Supreme Court (‘Hoge Raad’) in The Hague on 26 June 2020. 
This has resulted in the confirmation of the former decision. It means that Dutch ISIS women 
with children have officially lost their case through legal means. The Dutch policy concerning 
the repatriation of Dutch children of suspected ISIS fighters remains unchanged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 Integrale persconferentie van Mark Rutte, 22 Nov. 2019. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kuHtrsJhS5Q&t=1052s22 , accessed 31 May 2020. 
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2.2  What is the public debate in the Netherlands? 
This paragraph explains the rise of anti-Islamist sentiment in the Netherlands, through 
secondary sources. Sociologists have researched the origination of this phenomenon through 
the rise of populism, the rise of right-wing political parties in Dutch politics and a rise of 
Islamophobia expressed in Dutch media. 
Rise of populism 
Not only in the Netherlands, but in whole of Western-Europe a shift has taken place toward a 
more right-wing party ruling. Populism (also known as right wing nationalism) is on the rise 
in Europe.72 And some say that is because citizens are concerned about immigration and 
national identity.73 The fear of the influence that Islam has on Dutch society, and the fact that 
terrorist attacks in Europe increased, caused polarisation in the Netherlands. Right-wing 
politicians started picking up on that and focused on the failure of the integration of Muslim 
newcomers.74 Especially Islamic immigrants from Arab descent, coming from the MENA-
region became topic of discussion. 
It started with the rise in popularity of anti-immigration politicians like Islam criticist Pim 
Fortuyn. He criticised the Islam for being a backward and retarded religion that threatens the 
Dutch western, democratic values. 75  The Muslim population in the Netherlands began to feel 
like an outsider, which created a great division in Dutch society.76 After the first terrorist act 
in the Netherlands: the assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 200477, people began to 
think that the multicultural society in the Netherlands had failed.    
 Worries that Fortuyn already expressed, about preserving Dutch identity, echo in 
Geert Wilders PVV’s (Party for Freedom) election campaigns today. Wilders contributes to 
the polarisation of Dutch society.78 “PVV presents itself explicitly as an anti-Islam party 
 
72 Stijn van Kessel. “Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Parties: The Netherlands as a Case 
Study.” Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 12, no. 1, 2011, p.68. 
73 BBC Europe, “Europe and right-wing nationalism: A country-by-country guide”, BBC News, 13 Nov. 2019, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006 , accessed 10 June 2020. 
74 Stijn van Kessel. Ibid. p.69. 
75 De Volkskrant, “Fortuyn: grens dicht voor islamiet”, de Volkskrant, 9 Feb. 2002, 
https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/fortuyn-grens-dicht-voor-islamiet~b1867f23/ , accessed 7 
February 2020. 
76 Martijn de Koning. “Een ideologische strijd met de islam – Fortuyns gedachtegoed als scharnierpunt in de 
racialisering van moslims”, Research Gate, Apr. 2016, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301700058_Een_ideologische_strijd_met_de_islam_-
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directed at ‘de-Islamising’ Dutch society”.79 Wilders recalls a sense of Dutch nationalism 
through saying that Dutch identity, culture and heritage are at stake because of dangerous 
Muslim intruders.80          
 During the elections in 2017, the fast uprising of another populist party emerged: FVD 
(Forum for Democracy) with leader Thierry Baudet. Their sudden gain of support was caused 
by defected PVV voters now supporting FVD.81 Baudet also implied the vision that 
immigration has to be restricted, and that a policy on integration has to become stricter. 
“Immigrants from Africa and the Middle-East are not educated well enough to apply for jobs 
here, they do not add value to our society.”82      
Liberal Party moving to the political right: 
During the 2017 elections, the Liberal ruling party imitated some of Wilders stances on 
immigration, to appeal to PVV voters and simultaneously trying to exclude PVV from future 
participating in the Cabinet.83 So, in order to continue being the ruling party, the Liberal Party 
was pushed more and more towards the political right, becoming less receptive to immigrants 
over the years. VVD came with proposals to ‘get a grip on migration’.84  
In August 2019 the government implemented a law that banned all clothes covering the face 
to not be worn in public spaces,85 so Wilders partly got the ban on burqa’s he strived for.86 
Even though PVV has struggled to join and remain in government, it still had considerable 
influence on immigration policymaking in opposition.87  
The Liberal party had a difficult time creating a coalition after the 2017 elections, it took 
seven months to come to an agreement. The parties seemed unable to agree on a migration 
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and asylum policy in the first place. Especially left-wing party GreenLeft did not want to 
compromise to the strict immigration rules of the VVD.  
Going back to the debate about repatriation of ISIS children today, political parties in the 
Coalition are divided in two camps for quite some time already when it comes to the issue of 
the repatriation of ISIS’ families. VVD and CDA (Liberal Christian party)88 are against it, 
while D66 (social-liberal party) and CU (Christian democratic conservative party)89 strive for 
active repatriation. 90  
Islamophobia in the media 
Muslims notice that they are being stigmatized in the Dutch media as aggressive, 
untrustworthy, misogynistic fanatic, they feel discriminated on a daily basis.91  This 
underlying fear against the ‘other’ (Muslim, Arab) might be a factor influencing current 
Dutch policy towards the Muslim population. Islamophobia is a term that re-emerged after the 
terrorist attacks in Europe by ISIS supporters.92 Islamophobia is the “aversion to Muslims, 
based on negative stereotypes and prejudice against Muslims”.93 In Dutch politics, Geert 
Wilders is known for applying and nourishing Islamophobic discourse.94 This form of 
discrimination is expressed in media and politics by distinguishing immigrants (‘allochthoon) 
from the native Dutch (‘autochthoon’), dividing them in separate groups. 95 In the Netherlands 
Islamophobia is politically organised and goes hand in hand with populist parties that fear 
Muslim immigration. 96        
 Islamophobia or anti-Muslim sentiments are issues not only felt in the Netherlands, 
but across Europe the last few years. Populist leaders such as Marie Le Pen (France’s Front 
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Nationale) for example, used these sentiments to their advantage, they won more than 20% of 
the vote in presidential elections.97 
Concluding observations 
Looking at the sentiment in Dutch society towards Islam immigrants, it could be concluded 
that there is no majority in society that would back a decision of active repatriation of Dutch 
children of ISIS fighters. Based on these secondary sources, we know quite well that the 
notion of repatriating ISIS children is going to get a lot of opposition, because the Dutch 
public is afraid of it. A proactive repatriation would not give a lot of credit to the government 
and it would go against the stance of the Cabinet. Like PM Rutte once said himself: “If I had 
to choose, I would rather have them die in Syria or Iraq than to return and carry out attacks 
here.” 98 It is more a lack of political will and courage to not prioritize the lives of the 
children, the incentive or political urge is missing.99 There is almost no public voice that urges 
the government to do something, very little political pressure is existent on this topic. So, 
even though there is enough evidence that shows that the government should act on this, there 
is actually very little pressure and a lot of reasons why they should not take the chance with 
active repatriation. 
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2.3 What are other countries doing?  
This paragraph entails a comparative policy analysis based on secondary sources. The 
comparison is between the Dutch policy with policies of other states. This analysis will help 
to answer my research question, by exposing what is happening in other countries one can see 
what lessons the Dutch government can learn from them. 
Countries that actively repatriate:   
The following governments have taken on a different approach than the Dutch government 
and have decided to actively repatriate their national children of suspected ISIS fighters out of 
the camps in Northern-Syria. I am to find out what their reasons are for taking on this stance. 
Kosovo has already repatriated 32 women, 74 children and 4 male fighters in 2019 and are 
planning to eventually repatriate all national citizens that joined ISIS. A total of some 400 
Kosovo citizens joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq.100 The government has said to have a system in 
place to reintegrate ISIS members upon their return, some have said it is rather an 
experimental programme.101 Maybe because Kosovo is such a small country, it has taken this 
proactive repatriation approach: “[…] in bigger European countries returnees could easily 
become absorbed into the local population.” Also, the fact that Kosovo has a population of 90 
percent Muslims plays a role. Part of the idea behind active repatriation, is to re-educate ISIS 
families with the right perception of Islam. But main reason given is because Kosovo wants to 
give ISIS children a second chance, to avoid them from joining an ISIS-alike organisation. 102 
Central-Asian countries such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan have also actively 
repatriated 756 citizens in June 2019, the vast majority being children.103 These three 
countries are known for its great state control. Another worrisome element is that their ISIS 
nationals are suspected to have ties with terrorist organisation Taliban in neighbouring 
country Afghanistan, thus fear is that their ties with terrorism continue. Uzbekistan’s 
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strategies for deradicalizing are known to be very controversial, the state has extreme control 
over religious expression and practices. Also on Islam, even though Uzbekistan has a great 
Muslim majority. Therefore worries are that ISIS families will easily radicalise again, because 
their religion is highly suppressed. 104 
Morocco stated in October 2019 to welcome ISIS families back. But there have been no signs 
of the Moroccan government starting active repatriation yet. A total of 671 women and 
children of Moroccan descent are estimated to have joined ISIS.105  Reason behind the 
implementation of this policy, is that there has been a strong outcry by families of these 
children in Morocco whom have repeatedly asked their King for help. This has resulted in a 
royal pardon for some of the nationals that joined ISIS. A while later, one political party has 
stepped up for Moroccan ISIS members stuck in Syria. This party acknowledged that the 
Moroccan government is responsible for its own nationals, thus also for these families.106 In 
Morocco there is a political push that urges the government into the direction of active 
repatriation. 
Malaysia has stated that nationals are allowed to return home. Some will be detained upon 
arrival, others will have to follow a rehabilitation programme for a month and afterwards they 
will be monitored. Since October 2019, Malaysian authorities have repatriated some 40 
Malaysians and continues to bring back the remaining nationals too. But it is questioned if 
Malaysia has the expertise that is needed to properly deradicalize ISIS families, they have not 
really had to handle a similar case before. 107 
Tunisia has only brought back orphaned children. In 2017,2018 and January 2020 small 
groups of children of suspected ISIS fighters have been repatriated out of Libya. Tunisia has 
ties with the Libyan Red Crescent that is supervising these camps in Libya. Other Tunisian 
children in Libya are detained with their mothers, the mothers do not want their children to be 
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taken away from them. Tunisian children in Iraq and Syria have not been repatriated. But, 
government officials have said that they might be willing to take all of the children back.108 
Russia is an exceptional case, it is the most flexible country considering the children. The 
Russian government decided to only repatriate children and has been doing so for two years 
already. Out of Chechnya (an Islamic state within Russia) around 4000 Russian citizens 
departed to join ISIS. Chechnya holds the record for having the highest amount of national 
citizens that travelled to Syria. Some say that Russia’s exceptional policy is due to the fact 
that president Putin needs the support of the Islamic inhabitants in order to continue his 
rule.109  
Indonesia has repatriated a handful of families with children out of Syria. But the policy stays 
that -due to terrorist attacks of ISIS supporters in the past- the adult terrorist fighters are not 
welcome back. Children are considered a different story, under 10 years old they are 
welcome, depending on their case. Deradicalization schools for children exist in Indonesia, 
but the problem is that these are expensive and require a long-term mentoring program, 
therefore political commitment is lacking.110 It looks like the Indonesian government pretends 
to have suitable deradicalization programmes in place, but actually it has never been proven to 
work. 
The United States of America is the only Western country that has brought some nationals 
back, aiming to set the example for their anti-ISIS coalition partners to follow. USA is 
reported to have repatriated at least eighteen Americans – six men, three women and nine 
children. Reasons for USA’s repatriation are unique. First of all, the amount of Americans 
that joined ISIS in Syria is significantly lower than that of European countries. Therefore it is 
easier for the US to manage the risks that lie in repatriation nationals. Secondly, their criminal 
laws are more strict and can result in higher prison sentences than in other countries. But, 
most important argument for repatriating national citizens is that the American army has put 
great effort into bringing stability in the Syrian region, by leading the anti-ISIS coalition. So 
in order to continue to secure the region, foreign detainees have to be repatriated out of Syria 
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to put a halt to their further radicalisation with terrorist organisations.111 In February 2019 the 
USA called upon EU nation states to repatriate their ISIS’ family members.112 
European countries’ ambiguous policies: 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands only regard a very small number of children of 
ISIS fighters as potential security threats to their national societies. From 6 years old on the 
children might have been indoctrinated with ISIS ideology and from 9 years old on the 
children can have participated in ISIS military camps. Teenagers are the most worrisome 
group. But children are looked at on a case by case basis.113 According to Thomas Renard, 
around 1000 European children joined ISIS or other terrorist groups.114 When the first 
terrorist attacks hit Europe (2014-2015) many European countries hardened their policies 
towards returning ISIS’ families. 
In Belgium, the discussion about the return of ISIS families is more open than in the 
Netherlands, perhaps that is because Belgium has “the highest ratio of foreign terrorist 
fighters (FTF) per capita in Europe”, and subsequently also of returnees.115 Therefore, the 
issue can not be overlooked.116       
 Belgium’s approach to the children is related to that of the Netherlands: they are 
treated with a welfare and childcare approach.117 The difference with the Dutch policy is that 
orphaned Belgian children are very unlikely to be acknowledged of their Belgian nationality. 
Strict Belgian law does not grant them immediate Belgian nationality, not even after proof 
with a DNA-test. Another difference is that children under 10 who have proof of their Belgian 
nationality are automatically allowed to return, while children between the ages of 10-18 are 
to be decided case by case in Belgium. So, while Belgium has made a clear distinction 
between ages, the Netherlands does not apply an age-related policy yet. In Belgium, as well as 
in the Netherlands, remaining family members (parents and grandparents) have filed cases 
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against their government to demand active repatriation for the children. All without success.  
 But, recently the Belgian government has made a promise to repatriate the youngest 
Belgian ISIS children out of Syria, although the priority lies on repatriating orphans. End of 
June 2020, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Didier Reynders has disclosed that Belgian 
officials have arranged for ISIS children up until twelve years old to be repatriated in the 
coming weeks and the children will be cared for by Belgian family members.118 Belgium is 
starting to take on a more proactive policy towards the children of ISIS. 
“Germany is one of the European countries with the highest numbers of persons who 
travelled to Syria or Iraq out of Islamist motivation.”119 But, still deafening silence prevails in 
Germany on this topic, resulting in less public available data. The German government is very 
protective in revealing information that might jeopardize security measures. Their intelligence 
services warned for returnees, the issue was mostly discussed as a security issue by national 
authorities. 120           
 What is known about the German policy concerning ISIS’ children, is that the 
different states (Länder) are allowed to apply their own strategies for deradicalization and the 
fact that jail times in Germany are not as high in neighbouring countries is a problem. “[…] 
Thus measures need to be taken on a high level first, for it ever to come to active 
repatriation.121 Until a coherent strategy is in place in Germany, child services just try to 
develop an individual approach for each child.122      
 It is clear that Germany is keeping the issue of returning ISIS families behind closed 
doors. It has no official policy yet and the government has never allowed for the government 
officials to publicly comment on the topic. Noticeable is that the German media is also not on 
top of it. While for example Belgian an Dutch officials have sporadically spoken out about 
this topic in the Media.123   
France has been reticent when it comes to bringing back ISIS’ children, since they strongly 
believe children participated in ISIS’ battles. France had to cope with the most terrorist 
attacks, which is why the French government does not apply an active repatriation policy at 
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this moment. 124 But, exceptions exist and it seems as if the French policy is shifting towards a 
more proactive stance in repatriating ISIS children. Every so often French officials cooperate 
with local NGO’s to actively repatriate French children out of the camps in Syria. Reason for 
this shift is the fact that these children grow up unaccompanied in dangerous camps. 
 Mainly groups of orphans have been repatriated, Macron defended himself by stating 
that these children were isolated or orphans, they are the exception.125 End of June 2020 
media reported that recently not only orphans, but also ten French children whose parents are 
imprisoned have been brought back to France. The mothers had to give permission for their 
children to be repatriated by French officials. This is a very new development in European 
repatriation, an option that is also investigated by other European states. Just no country 
seems to want to try this option because it is controversial. Apparently France is volunteering 
as ‘the guinea pig’.126          
 It is a known fact that France already has some detailed protocols in place, just like the 
Netherlands, in case the children do come back.127 the role of each actor at every stage is 
clear.  But the fear of the mothers returning with the children prevails in maintaining a passive 
repatriation of the France government.128 
The United Kingdom acts like Germany in keeping the entire issue behind its political closed 
doors. Their Ministry of foreign affairs has admitted that a very small amount of children 
have been taken to the UK, but nothing is known about the children. The only statement made 
thus far is that the UK is ‘investigating if the children can be brought back’, but there is no 
active repatriation. 129 This policy statement resembles the Dutch government’s stance.  
Conclusions comparative analysis 
It seems that there is a correlation between countries that have taken the difficult decision to 
actively repatriate ISIS children and countries with a high Muslim population. All I know is 
that after studying the Dutch policy, I noticed that the public stance holds anti-Islam 
 
124 Ibid. 
125 Daan Kool, Sacha Kester et al. “Zo Denken Ze in Andere Landen over Het Terughalen Van IS-Kinderen.” De 
Volkskrant, 11 June 2019, www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/zo-denken-ze-in-andere-landen-over-het-
terughalen-van-is-kinderen~becce0d6/, accessed 17 April 2020. 
126 Daan Kool. “Frankrijk haalt tien ‘kwetsbare’ kinderen van Syriëgangers terug”, De Volkskrant, 22 June 2020, 
https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/frankrijk-haalt-tien-kwetsbare-kinderen-van-syriegangers-
terug~bda54fdf/ , accessed 22 June 2020. 
127 Coolsaet, Rik and Renard, Thomas. “Children in the Levant:  Insights from Belgium on the dilemmas of 
repatriation and the challenges of reintegration”, Security Policy Briefs, 11 July 2018, p.8.  
128 Daan Kool, Sacha Kester et al. Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
39 
 
sentiments, which unfolds in a lack of political support for active repatriation of ISIS children. 
I presume that Islamophobia is not existent to such an extent in countries with a bigger 
Muslim population, that it refrains their government from active repatriation of national and 
fellow Muslim (ISIS supporting) citizens.  
Another element for active repatriation in European countries, but not so much of an 
argument for countries with higher Muslim populations, is the faith that governments have in 
their own deradicalization system. European governments are more likely to think it is too 
risky to repatriate children if they do not have the proper reception programmes in place to 
rehabilitate or deradicalize the children to such an extent that they will not be a threat to their 
society anymore. Countries with a Muslim majority rather prioritize the argument of the 
severe circumstances in the camps; the humanitarian crisis in Northern-Syria, over their fears 
of a lack of proper deradicalization programmes. Or maybe, but these are just speculations, 
these countries do not acknowledge that their deradicalization programme is not functioning 
properly. But in order to prove that, in depth research in the policies of the Muslim-majority 
countries is needed. 
So, countries with a Muslim majority engage the problem from a humanitarian point of view 
by focussing on the suffering of human beings and their need for immediate help. European 
countries rather focus on the security element; the fact that the children of ISIS fighters might 
be dangerous. That might be because the danger that lies in returnees wanting to take revenge 
is higher for European countries, since ISIS has indoctrinated its supporters with anti-Western 
sentiments that have been outed in terrorist attacks (in capital cities) all over Europe. As a 
reaction, mostly Western countries (but also Russia) have joined the anti-ISIS coalition, 
which has given ISIS more reason to hate European countries that bombed ISIS supporters. 
The USA is just an exceptional case, they want to set the right example to other Western 
states (mostly aimed at European states) by repatriating. The UN continuously asked the 
international community to repatriate their national citizens out of Syria. As well as the 
European Parliament that called upon nation states to start repatriation the children. 
Unfortunately this has not resulted into jointly action being taken yet. 130  
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In comparing European countries in their policy on ISIS’ children, two crucial points seem to 
be present. First of all, exceptions that are made are mostly made for orphaned children only. 
Children without parents are easier to repatriate because it means that the fear of return of the 
(even more dangerous) parents is excluded.  And second of all, all of the mentioned European 
states prefer a tailormade approach, rather than taking on a clear policy that could be applied 
on national all children returning.  
Striking is that in the Netherlands and France the debate is highly politicised, but much less in 
Belgium and it is not even a topic of public discussion in Germany or the UK.131 Main 
explanation for differences in the approach is that each European state deals with a different 
amount of national returnees.132 
Most European countries maintain an ambiguous position: they see that children in the camps 
suffer dire conditions, but do not repatriate actively because of the security threat. Some 
European states slowly began to see that their policy is untenable. France has started taking on 
a proactive stance, Belgium has started to repatriate all Belgian ISIS children until 10-12 
years old. 
The problem with all of the European policies is that a comprehensive policy is missing. 
Vertical cooperation between government institutions in all European countries is a crucial 
tool to exchange as much information as possible and to monitor the development of returning 
children together. Cooperation between nation states could contribute to make active 
repatriation happen sooner and it would lead for no foreign child to be excluded from 
repatriation.133  
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Section 3: Conclusion and Discussion 
Conclusion 
The research question at the start of this thesis was: Why does Dutch foreign policy on Dutch 
children of suspected ISIS fighters not entail active repatriation? The answer to this question 
can be found in one main argument substantiated by four sub arguments.  
The main argument is the decision of the cassation appeal on 26th of June 2020. Although 
international treaties and laws clearly state that repatriation of the children must be active, 
since they are Dutch underaged citizens and therefore have to be protected by the Dutch 
government, the Supreme Court has judged in the cassation appeal that the implementation of 
active repatriation is a strictly political decision. Jurisprudence has no say in the assessment if 
local circumstances in Northern Syria are safe enough to start active repatriation. This 
authoritative decision provides the Dutch government a license to continue its current policy 
of non-intervention. The Dutch mothers and children in the camps have depleted all legal 
options in their struggle to force the Dutch government to bring them back home.  
Now that the judicial consequences have been set aside, the moral and political debate 
remains. We have to wait and see if this cassation appeal means that the discussion on active 
repatriation has ended now. One might expect that the families of suspected ISIS members 
will not give up. Their living conditions and prospects are so low, that they will keep striving 
for a human perspective, at least for their children. 
The Dutch government persists in its non-repatriation policy with the following arguments: 
Firstly, it is hard to determine how dangerous the children are. Uncertainty about their mental 
and physical stability prevails. Indoctrination with ISIS’ ideologies, military trainings, the 
traumas due to their time live in a war zone and totalitarian state might effected the behaviour 
and development of the children. AIVD and NCTV warn the Dutch government about  
possible (terrorist) threats that children of suspected ISIS fighters can pose to Western 
democratic societies in the future. Therefore, the Dutch government regards this as a national 
security argument: for the sake of protecting Dutch society, these children will not be picked 
up from the camps.  
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Secondly, it is unsafe for Dutch government officials to travel to Northern-Syria due to 
ongoing political tensions between the Kurds, smaller sectarian groups, the Assad regime and 
the Turkish army. The war in Syria is not over, the situation continues to be unstable. The 
Dutch embassy in Syria continues to be closed, therefore it is too big of a risk to jeopardize 
the lives of Dutch officials to rescue these children. ISIS’ families have chosen themselves to 
travel to a war zone to join a terrorist organisation, therefore it is their own responsibility to 
travel to the nearest Dutch embassy or consulate.  
The third argument is closely linked to the second argument. Cooperation with the Kurds is 
complicated, it might be interpreted as if the Dutch government recognizes the Kurds as a 
diplomatic partner. International political tensions have risen since the Kurds struggle for an 
independent state, the UN does not recognize the Kurdish officials as a governmental entity. 
Therefore, the Dutch government is not willing to risk their international relations with 
partners in the Middle-East over an active repatriation of children of ISIS. This is the Dutch 
government’s foreign policy argument. 
Fourth and last argument is that the political support for an active repatriation is lacking. 
Within the Dutch Parliament, but also in the public opinion within the Netherlands. During 
the past three decades Dutch politics has shifted into the direction of the right on the political 
spectrum. The rise of populist parties encouraged nationalism by holding on to Dutch 
traditions and demanding a hold on the influx of refugees. Populism has fuelled polarisation 
in Dutch society. In trying to confront this threat, the ruling Liberal Party (VVD) also moved 
to the right on issues like immigration and integration of newcomers, to avoid its voters from 
defecting to more extreme right parties. In the current polarised political climate, the political 
centre parties fear that Dutch voters will not be very receptive to embrace active repatriation 
policy of ISIS’ children. 
The strength is, that these are all military and diplomatic sound protective arguments based on 
the current dangerous situation in Syria. The weak spot in the governments stance is that the 
Netherlands has to fulfil its legal commitments to the ISIS children as Dutch civilians.  
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Discussion 
With these four formal arguments listed above, the Dutch government bolsters its non-
interventionist stance. In this discussion section I will criticize the non-active repatriation 
policy on Dutch children of suspected ISIS fighters by highlighting the various opponent’s 
counterarguments on this policy and arguing why active repatriation might be a more 
effective policy. 
It makes sense that it is assumed that these children are dangerous, because they have been 
part of one of the most dangerous terrorist organisations the world has encountered. However, 
as AIVD & NCTV reports mention, every child’s experience has been different from their 
timing living under ISIS’ regime. Not all children were indoctrinated through Salafist 
education, only part of the boys did undergo military trainings, and most children were too 
young to be heavily traumatised by war or ISIS that they could pose a threat upon return. We 
should avoid generalisation. The Dutch government does not face a group of 200 ISIS’ 
children, but 200 individual persons.  
The International Children’s Rights argument stated that children at fist instance should be 
regarded as innocent and victims of the situation. They can not be punished for decisions their 
parents have taken, they deserve a future independent from their past with ISIS. In the 
Netherlands proper care, educational facilities and expertise exists to help children get their 
lives back on track again. The fact that the Dutch government has instructed the Child 
Protection Council to develop a personalised plan for each child (that investigates the family 
situation back home), shows that the Dutch government and Dutch child care system is 
willing and prepared to help Dutch children of suspected ISIS fighters. 
Another argument mentioned by experts, is that monitoring their developments and 
movements here, to help them overcome their traumas and indoctrinations is far more 
effective than letting them grow up of  a war-torn area with no help there, stranded in camps 
that are a breeding ground for radicalisation. 
The current policy on the children of suspected ISIS fighters is not coherent but rather 
contradictory, unclear and inconsistent. It causes confusion.  
Two orphaned children have been repatriated, does that mean that Dutch policy can be 
adjusted in the future and that more children will be brought back home? Or will this practice 
stay limited to just these two children? The Dutch government found a loophole in its own 
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policy by repatriating some orphaned children and they stress that this was an exception to the 
rule only. This way, the Dutch government keeps the current formal policy in tact. Only time 
will tell us what will happen in the near future. One of the scenario’s – although this is not 
very likely – is that circumstances in Syria change into the direction of enduring peace. If so, 
the argument of the Supreme Court that the situation is too unsafe would no longer apply, and 
a revision of that decision can be expected. That revision could maintain the obligation of the 
Dutch government to repatriate Dutch children of suspected ISIS fighters after all.  
The following elements characterize the current Dutch policy: children are the victims and 
therefore states are responsible for offering them protection, but children are not allowed to be 
separated from their parents, and the Dutch government does not want the parents to return 
since they are considered dangerous to Western society; thus the Dutch government will not 
actively repatriate. The current policy of non-active repatriation thus can be explained as 
circular reasoning, as explained in the following graphic image I created: 
 
 
 
 
START and END here: 
Retaining the policy of 
non-active repatriation of 
Dutch children of 
suspected ISIS fighters, 
therefore the children are 
kept in camps in Northern-
Syria.
But, the Dutch 
government acknowledges 
that there is the 
international  
responsibility to protect 
children (CRC) . And in 
the camps children suffer 
from dire consequences of 
the war.
Children can not be separated 
from their parents (CRC), the 
Dutch government will not 
separate children from their 
mothers. Also, the Kurdish 
authorities do not allow that to 
happen.
The parents (mothers and 
fathers) are regarded as 
possibly dangerous 
terrorists by the Ministry 
of Justice, therefore the 
Dutch government does 
not want the parents to 
return.
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The possibility rate and pitfalls of the Dutch government in changing its formal point of view 
on children of suspected ISIS fighters to an active repatriation policy can be summarised in 
the following table I created: 
 
Options: 
 
Amount of children 
 
Possibility rate of success 
1) Repatriation of           
0 children  
Very small, since a few children already have been 
brought back to the Netherlands. 
 
Then what is the consequence, letting them grow-up in 
post-conflict area where radicalisation easily happens? 
 
2)  Repatriation of               
all (circa) 210 
children 
Small possibility. Best option when looking at 
international agreements (CRC), but almost impossible to 
execute if each child’s case has to be judged individually 
by Dutch authorities. 
 
Issue: huge uncertainty on how Dutch public opinion will 
react if this happens. 
 
3) 
 
Repatriation of 
some children, but 
not all. 
 
eg: 50  repatriated; 
150 not. 
Likely possibility, because the Dutch policy currently 
entails a case-by-case analysis of each child to distinct 
children from being a possibly dangerous threat to the 
Western society and children that seem to have not been 
severely indoctrinated yet. 
 
Counterargument:  where should the Dutch government 
draw the line? This option is highly subjective and 
requires arbitrary decisions. It ends up rescuing part of 
the group of Dutch ISIS children, but not all of them. 
What will be the decisive factors for repatriation? The 
specific camp where the children reside in? This suggests 
random selection and pure guesswork. It is most unlikely 
that the Dutch government is willing to legitimize what  
justifiable selection criteria would look like. 
 
4)  Repatriation of 
exclusively 
orphaned children . 
Likely possibility. Currently this option is already 
executed, according to the obligations laid down in the 
CRC, orphans require obligatory government aid once 
parents have deceased.  
 
But, if the Dutch government sticks to this policy, it 
would mean they are literally waiting for parents to die in 
the camps, in order for them to bring Dutch children into 
safety. This is not a tenable policy perceived from a 
human rights perspective. This might raise the expectance 
that children whose parents are alive, should receive 
government aid as well. 
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This model illustrates that the government has opened a ‘can of worms’ by repatriating 
orphaned children. Legitimising the repatriation of one selection of children has opened up an 
avalanche of ethical arguments to why eventually all children should be repatriated. If a 
similar research would be done in half a year or maybe even in a few years time, it is more 
likely that academics and experts have researched this topic further than it has been done 
today.  
This research has some limitations that need to be specified. Due to a limited amount of time 
and a limit to the amount of words I haven not been able to conduct more in depth research, 
through for example interviews with experts or members of the parliament, or by conducting a 
survey amongst part of the Dutch population to measure their receptivity to an active 
repatriation stance of the Dutch government. The question would then have also been how 
many politicians would have wanted to openly discuss it with me, since it is very sensitive 
topic.            
 Due to the fact that this topic is recent and political developments are still ongoing, it 
turned out harder than expected to conduct academic sources in articles and books. I thus rely 
heavily on media outlets.          
 Due to the outbreak of the Covid-19 epidemic and the consequential closing of the 
University buildings like the essential infrastructure of the University Library, I have not  
been able to loan books since March 2020. Therefore I did not have access to all the books I 
wanted to use, and in the online extensive database these books were not always available.  
Future research should compare the existence of Islamophobia; anti-immigrant sentiments in 
Dutch society, with the current passive policy of the Dutch government to repatriate ISIS’ 
children, to prove there is a connection. Another research suggestion could be to dive deeper 
into media coverage of this topic, research how often the topic is mentioned in newspapers or 
on tv shows to further investigate if there is enough public pressure on the government to 
change its policy.          
 One might consider to also conduct a quantitative sociology study. This will add 
additional value to the methodology (FPA) applied in this paper. It could clarify the ongoing 
sentiments in Dutch by using interviews or polls for example.    
 Also, other research should cover the topic of the few repatriated children, maybe even 
compare the different approaches of various governments again. Are the children integrated or 
do they continue to be dangerous to society? This can be done by elaborating on child 
psychologist Gerrit Loots reports for example. Depending on the outcome, this might generate  
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more evidence for the Dutch government to start active repatriation immediately, or to stick 
even stronger to non-repatriation.  
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Appendix: map and photos of the camps 
 
Geographical map pointing out the three camps in North-East Syria controlled by the Kurds 
Overview of the biggest camp Al Hol © UNICEF/Al Hol Camp in Syria/2019/Hawa  
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Children in camp Ain Issa are preparing a meal © AFP  
 
Children filling up bottles with drinking water in Al-Hol camp © AFP  
 
 
 
